GIFT  OF 
Mrs.   L.    J«  Richardson 


fHR 


IMPERIAL  GERMANY 


A  LECTURE 


BERNARD      MOSES 


BERKELEY,    CAT,. 

1386 


3  in  per  t  a  I    C!3  ermdnn.11 


rT1HE  events  associated  with  the  foundation  and 
development  of  the  new  German  Empire 
constitute  the  most  important  episode  in  the 
history  of  Europe  since  the  fall  of  Napoleon. 
They  stand  as  the  culmination  of  a  series  of 
events  beginning  with  the  Prussian  reaction 
against  French  domination  in  1813.  To  be  un- 
derstood, they  must  be  viewed  in  the  light  of 
the  failure  of  the  arrangement  effected  by  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  and  of  the  more  or  less  aim- 
less struggles  embraced  under  the  general  desig- 
nation of  the  Revolution  of  1848.  The  new 
German  Empire  arose  out  of  the  ruins  of  the 
medieval  empire  which  ceased  to  exist  in  1806, 
when  Francis  II.  laid  down  the  imperial  crown. 
At  the  time  of  its  dissolution,  the  mediaeval  em- 
pire was  one  of  the  oldest  political  institutions  of 

*  Delivered  before  the  Political  Science  Club  of  the  Univer- 
sity of  California,  October  20,  188  j. 


Europe.  Its  existence  stretched  over  the  thou- 
sand years  from  Charlemagne,  in  the  beginning 
of  the  ninth  century,  to  Napoleon,  in  the  begin- 
ning1 of  the  nineteenth  century.  It  rested  oa 
the  sublime  idea  that  it  was  the  sole  instrument 
for  manifesting'  and  executing  the  will  of  God 
with  reference  tj  the  political  government  of  the 
world.  This  idea  constituted  the  basis  of  its. 
pretension  to  universal  dominion,  but,  like  many 
of  the  ideas  suggested  by  the  distorted  Christi- 
anity of  the  Middle  Ages,  it  was  utterly  unre- 
alizable. The  mediaeval  empire  was  formed  un- 
der the  influence  of  religious  visionaries,  and 
declined  with  the  awakening  practical  intelli- 
gence of  modern  times.  The  central  power  of 
the  Empire  gradually  vanished  before  the  rising 
power  of  the  constituent  States,  till  at  last  the 
Emperor  retained  only  an  empty  nam^  and  a 
powerless  scepter. 

The  year  which  witnessed  the  final  dissolution 
of  this  ancient  institution  saw  also  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  This 
Confederation  had  little  significance,  except 
as  a  means  for  facilitating  the  exercise  of  French 
influence  in  the  affairs  of  Germany.  It  was  under 
the  protection  of  Napoleon,  who  had  "the  power  of 
summoning  the  Federal  Assembly,  and  of  initia- 


ting  ail  discussions  in  it,  through  its  prince-pres- 
ident, the  Duke  of  Dilberg."  He  had  also  "the 
right  of  naming  the  prince-president,  and  the 
right  of  commanding  the  confederation  to  make 
war  or  peace." 

With  the  overthrow  of  Napoleon,  in  1814,  the 
Confederation  disappeared,  and  the  political 
disintegration  of  Germany  became  complete. 
Before  1814,  the  year  marked  by  the  Congress 
of  Vienna,  the  most  persistent  political  tendency 
in  the  history  of  Germany  was  the  tendency 
toward  disunion  and  particularism.  With  this 
year,  however,  begins  an  opposite  course  of  pro- 
gress, leading  by  successive  steps  to  a  more 
complete  governmental  union  of  the  German 
people.  The  first  step  in  this  new  direction  wras 
the  formation  of  the  Germanic  Confederation, 
comprehending  all  the  German  states,  under 
the  presidency  of  Austria.  The  second  step 
was  the  formation  cf  the  North  German  Union 
in  which  several  of  the  most  important  South 
German  states,  as  Austria,  Bavaria,  Wiirtem- 
berg,  and  Baden,  were  not  included.  The  final 
step  was  the  organization  of  the  Empire.  This 
event  is  noteworthy  not  merely  because  through 
it  was  secured  the  present  union  of  a  large  part 
of  the  German  people  under  one  supreme  gov- 


6 


eminent,  but  also  because  in  it  there  was 
adopted  a  constitutional  provision  contributing  to 
secure  the  perpetual  maintenance  of  this  union. 
The  provision  referred  to  is  that  by  which  the 
power  to  veto  any  proposition  for  constitutional 
change  is  placed  in  the  hands  of  Prussia,  whose 
government  is  strongly  blended  with  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  Empire,  whose  King  is  also 
Emperor,  and  whose  interests  demand  not  only 
that  the  bonds  of  union  between  the  States  be 
maintained,  but  that  the  States  be  brought  into 
a  closer  union  and  more  complete  subordination 
to  the  central  government.  If  we  bear  in  mind 
these  facts,  that  Prussia  has  seventeen  members 
in  the  Federal  Council,  appointed  by  the  King, 
that  fourteen  negative  votes  in  this  Council  are 
adequate  to  defeat  any  proposed  constitutional 
amendment,  and  that  Prussia  is  vitally  inter- 
ested in  defeating  all  constitutional  changes  that 
do  not  tend  to  strengthen  the  central  govern- 
ment, we  can  readily  see  that,  in  the  establish- 
ment of  the  Empire,  we  have  not  merely  the 
fact  of  German  unity  achieved,  but  at  the  same 
time  the  strongest  possible  check  laid  on  the 
spirit  of  decentralization.  Nothing  short  of  a 
revolution  or  the  overthrow  of  the  imperial 


government  by  a  foreign  state  can  stop  the  slow 
but  sure  drift  of  power  towards  the  center. 

But  within  the  central  government  itself,  the 
distribution  of  power  is  not  such  as  to  insure 
prem  inency  of  the  present  political  order  among 
the  several  departments.  It  is  true,  generally, 
that  it  is  impossible  to  apportion  the  power  of  a 
government  among  the  several  departments  so 
nicely  that  they  will  continue,  as  it  were,  in  a 
condition  of  stable  equilibrium.  One  or  another 
will  inevitably  have  an  advantage  of  position, 
and  thus  gradually  draw  to  itself  the  balance  of 
power.  In  the  early  English  government,  the 
possession  of  the  right  of  initiating  financial 
legislation  constituted  the  Commons'  advantage 
of  position.  Through  this  it  has  been  possible 
for  that  body  to  arrogate  to  itself  all  that  power 
which  was  formerly  held  by  other  departments. 
In  the  course  of  political  change  there  is  mani- 
fest a  strong  tendency  to  unite  the  initiating, 
adapting,  and  executing  powers  in  the  same 
person  or  body;  and  when  popular  representation 
is  admitted  and  maintaiiel,  that  body  which 
.stands  in  closest  sympathy  with  the  electors  will 
ultimately  acquire  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
government,  and  hold  the  position  of  superior 
eiuleiK'e,  In  the  imperial  government  of 


8 


Germany  popular  representation  is  admitted, 
but  the  representative  body  has  only  the  power  to 
accept  or  reject  propositions  submitted  to  it.  It 
has  no  power  to  initiate  m enures,  and  conse- 
quently no  power  to  m  ike  its  originating  will 
felt  directly  in  the  affiirs  of  government. 
Whenever  the  initiating  function  is  withheld 
from  the  representative  branch  of  the  legislature 
a  conflict  is  inaugurated  which  will  result  in  the 
representative  body  becoming  either  more  or 
iess.  In  England,  where  this  condition  of  affairs 
formerly  existed,  the  representive  body  has 
gained  not  only  the  right  of  initiating  measures, 
but  also  an  acknowledged  supremacy  over  the 
other  departments  of  government.  The  Reichs- 
tag, or  representative  body  in  the  imperial 
legislature,  in  its  control  over  taxation,  has 
essentially  the  position  of  advantage  through 
which  the  English  Commons  achieved  independ- 
ence. If  the  Reichstag  fails  to  mike  use  of  its 
advantage,  the  Emperor,  ministry,  and  federal 
council  will  extend  their  authority  at  itsexpense. 
Any  organ  of  the  sovereign,  in  the  unrestrained 
exercise  of  its  delegated  power,  will  always  tend 
to  enlarge  the  field  of  its  jurisdiction.  As  long 
as  the  majority  of  the  Reichstag  is  in  esseatial 
accord  with  the  ministry  and  federal  council, 


this  b'Kly  111  ly  ba  content  simply  to  register  its 
affirm  itive  or  negltive  decision  on  propositions 
.submitted  to  it;  but  when  the  majority  of  the 
members  find  themselves  committed  to  pro- 
positions vvhii'h  the  initiating'  bodies  are  re- 
luctant to  formal. ite  into  1  iws,  the  representatives 
will  imperatively  dem  md  the  right  of  ini- 
tiating bills  through  which  they  may  give 
direct  expression  to  their  views.  That  the 
views  of  a  large  number  of  the  representatives,  in 
the  near  future,  will  stand  in  sharp  contrast  to 
those  of  the  ministry  may  be  clearly  seen  from 
the  fact  that  every  election  brings  into  the 
Reichstag  an  increased  number  of  members 
whose  fundamental  political  principles  are  in 
direct  Conflict  with  those  of  the  Emperor  and 
his  ministers.  If  the  balance  of  power  in  the 
imperial  government  drifts  into  the  Reichstag, 
it  will  fill  into  the  hands  of  men  for  the  most 
p  irt  untrained  in  self-government.  For  gener- 
ations under  military  tutelage  and  class  domina- 
tion, the  Germans  of  the  Empire  have  lost  much 
ofth.it  power  of  self-determination  and  self-re- 
str.iint  whijh  are  necessary  to  the  conduct  of  a 
government  by  representatives  of  the  people.  If, 
on  the  other  hand,  power  drifts  more  completely 
into  the  hands  of  the  Emperor  and  his  ministers, 


10 

the  imperial  government  will  assume  that  form 
of  absolutism  which  marked  the  governments  of 
nearly  all  important  European  states  in  the 
seventeenth  century,  and  whose  disastrous  out- 
come in  most  cases  is  a  "familiar  tale  of  history. 
One  or  the  other  of  these  alternatives  will 
inevitably  be  realized,  and  in  neither  direction 
is  the  outlook  specially  hopeful. 

Those  who  judge  of  the  excellences  or  defect 
of  government  from  the  somewhat  exalted 
standpoint  of  metaphysical  speculation,  are  like- 
ly to  award  that  one  the  first  place  which  pos- 
sesses the  most  complete  organization  and  is 
most  successful  in  preserving  peace  and  order 
among  its  subjects.  There  is  no  doubt 
that  the  maintenance  of  an  efficient  police  sup- 
ervision over  the  conduct  of  its  citizens-Ms  an  im- 
portant function  of  the  state.  Judged  merely 
with  reference  to  its  success  in  this  direction, 
the  present  German  government  must  be  given 
a  very  high  rank.  There  is  very  much  in  this 
phase  of  its  activity  to  excite  admiration.  But 
repression  is  not  the  only  aim  of  wise  political 
administration.  It  is  one  of  the  highest  aims  of 
government  so  to  order  public  affairs  lh.it  the 
individuals  who  make  up  the  nation  shall  not 
degenerate.  When  this  end  Ls  overlooked  in 


11 


attempts  to  carry  out  thoroughly  a  system  of 
minute  control,  the  government  is  not  attaining 
its  highest  purpose.  As  the  organism  which 
thinks  and  speaks  for  the  multitudes,  who  recog- 
nize its-  authority,  it  is  the  business  of  the 
government  to  make  possible  such  conditions 
as  will  favor  the  growth  of  a  strong,  temperate, 
self-reliint,  and  intelligent  nation.  The  repres- 
sive policy  of  the  German  Empire,  curtailing  on 
every  side  the  field  uf  independent  individual 
action,  and  hedging  evch  citizen  about  so 
narrowly  that  he  loses  much  of  the  feeling  of 
personal  responsibility,  tends  to  degrade  the 
great  body  of  the  nation  to  the  position  of  an 
unthinking  rabble.  Repression,  therefore,  breeds 
a  condition  of  society  which  makes  repression 
necessary.  It  carries  with  it  no  hope  of  a  better 
state.  Once  entered  upon,  it  becomes  a  necessity, 
and  by  it  the  nation  is  driven  into  successive 
stages  of  social  irresponsibility,  till  at  last  it  is 
torn  asunder  in  the  conflicts  of  classes,  or  ends 
ingloriously  in  utter  stagnation. 

There  is  something  worse  in  a  nation  than  the 
confusion  and  uproar  of  democracy,  and  that  is- 
orderly  conduct  which  has  been  reached  at  the 
cost  of  social  independence  and  individual  self- 
respect.  Venice  and  Florence,  in  their  careers 


12 


as  independent  states,  illustrate  the  contrast. 
The  officers  of  the  Venetian  government,  in  the 
execution  of  the  repressive  policy,  were  omni- 
present and  omniscient.  The  citizen  who  stepped 
aside  from  his  narrowly  prescribed  course  of 
conduct  was  speedily,  and  often  without  cere- 
mony, overtaken  by  the  penalty  of  the  violated 
law.  As  a  result,  throughout  a  long  period  of 
its  history,  Venice  remained  remarkably  free 
from  internal  strife  and  noisy  popular  disturb- 
ance. Yet,  in  spite  of  ail  the  advantages  of 
abundant  wealth,  of  internal  quiet,  and  exten- 
sive intercourse  with  the  most  cultivated 
nations  of  the  world,  Venice  did  not  produce 
men  who  have  made  themselves  remembered. 
Florence,  on  the  other  hand,  which  for  centuries 
was  tilled  with  struggles  of  pirties  and  the  up- 
roar of  political  agitation,  occupies  a  large  place 
in  the  history  of  European  civilization,  and 
many  of  the  most  exalted  spirits  of  modern 
times  received  their  first  and  abiding  impulses 
from  the  free  life  of  the  republic.  It  is  not,  how- 
ever, pertinent  to  the  subject  in  hand  to  affirm 
or  deny  that  literature,  art,  and  learning  will 
thrive  under  a  governmental  policy  which  may 
be  designated  as  repressive  or  protective. 
What  I  wish  specially  to  emph  isi/e  is,  that 


13 


although  such  a  policy  prevails  in  Germany,  it 
can,  under  no  interpretation,  be  set  down  as  an 
element  in  the  cause  of  that  nation's  exalted 
position  in  the  intellectual  world.  The  men 
who  have  given  Germany  her  scholarly  repu- 
tation are  not  the  products  of  a  stagnant  society; 
in  fact  communities  or  nations  that  are  willing 
or  are  forced  to  allow  everything  to  be  done  for 
them  are  not  likely  to  produce  original  or 
creative  minds.  In  refutation  of  this  view  the 
reign  of  Louis  XIV.  is  often  cited.  A  critical 
examination  of  this  portion  of  French  history 
shows,  however,  that  the  literary  splendor  of 
the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  "was  not  the  result  of 
his  efforts,  but  was  the  work  of  that  great  gen- 
eration which  preceded  him;  and  that  the  intel- 
lect of  France,  so  far  from  being  benefited  by 
his  munificence,  was  hampered  by  his  protec- 
tion." The  national  intellect  was  stunted  by 
the  supervision  of  the  court,  and,  "as  a  natural 
consequence,  the  minds  of  man,  driven  from  the 
higher  departments,  took  refuge  in  the  lower, 
and  concentrated  themselves  upra  those  inferior 
subjects  where  the  discovery  of  truth  is  not  the 
main  object,  but  where  beauty  of  form  and  ex- 
pression are  the  things  chiefly  pursued."  The 
influence  of  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.  on  the  Li- 


telleetual  life  of  France  was,  in  the  first  place, 
"to  sacrifice  science  to  art,"  and,  in  the  second 
place,  to  cause  the  decay  of  art  itself. 

But  no  parallel  between  Germany  and  France 
in  this  regard  is  possible,  for  Germany  is  only 
now  entering  upon  a  phase  of  history  through 
which  Franc^  passed  long  ago.  England,  France, 
arid  Spain  pissed  through  brilliant  periods  of  in- 
tellectual activity  and  literary  culture  before 
Germany  had  fully  shaken  off  the  slumber  of 
the  Middle  Ages.  The  Protestant  Reformation, 
Which  turned  all  intellectual  force  to  theological 
study  and  discussion;  the  Thirty*Years'  War, 
which  destroyed  the  nation's  basis  of  physical 
support;  and  the  subsequent  century  of  recu- 
peration, filled  with  petty  jealousies  and  internal 
wars,  furnish  adequate  reason  for  the  late  de- 
velopment of  the  German  people.  Their  great 
intellectual  achievements  belong  to  the  century 
since  the  death  of  Frederick  the  Great,  a  cen- 
tury in  which  the  great  body  of  the  people  have 
continued  a  living  and  originating  force.  In  the 
struggle  for  independence,  in  1813,  they  played 
a  leading  }nrt.  When  Prussia  entered  the 
war  against  Napoleon  the  same  year,  the 
people  lead  and  the  king  followed.  The 
political  agitations  which  made  the  middle 


15 


years  of  the  century  memorable,  showed 
the  people  still  able  of  taking-  a  vigorous  ini- 
tiative. Pursuing1  this  line  of  thought,  it 
becomes  clear  that  G^rminy  his  grown  to  her 
present  degree  of  intellectual  eminence  under 
social  conditions  entirely  unlike  those  which 
have  been  imposed  on  the  nation  by  the  Empire. 
The  past  century  of  German  history  which 
records  the  rise  of  the  nation  to  greatness, 
records  also  the  operations  of  a  spirit  of 
popular  unrest,  and  strong  national  aspirations 
towards  an  exalted  end  more  or  less  definitely 
conceived.  Whether  the  influence  of  the  exist- 
ing system,  which  tends  to  crowd  the  common 
people  into  a  uniformity  of  insignificance,  will 
be  such  as  to  continue  the  growth  of  the  past 
hundred  years,  can  be  definitely  determined 
only  by  the  enquirers  of  the  next  century.  The 
teaching  of  the  repressive  policy,  however,  as 
seen  in  history,  suggests  a  probable  negative. 
There  may  be  schools  of  perfect  organization 
and  equipment,  but  unless  there  is  independ- 
ence of  character  in  the  bulk  of  the  nation,  and 
a  strong  feeling  of  self-reliance  and  self-respect, 
it  is  vain  to  look  for  the  development  or  con- 
tinuance of  national  greatness.  There  may 
be  the  most  efficient  army  in  the  world,  but  it 


16 

will  be  no  guarantee  of  continued  prosperity,  if 
the  expenditure  for  its  maintenance  absorbs  an 
undue  portion  of  the  national  income.  The 
army  of  the  Empire  is  no  doubt  necessary  to 
preserve  the  integrity  of  the  imperial  territory, 
but  at  the  same  time  the  burden  which  it  im- 
poses on  the  nation  must  be  set  down  among  the 
sources  of  economic  weakness. 

Germany  at  present  is  in  the  condition  of  the 
athlete  who  has  attained  the  object  of  his  train- 
ing and  is  at  the  height  of  his  vigor.  His  won- 
derful development,  however,  is  no  guarantee  of 
a  long  life  and  a  hearty  old  age.  On  the  con- 
trary, the  records  of  such  lives  show  an  aston- 
ishingly large  number  of  cases  suffering  early 
death  or  premature  decline.  They  have  paid 
out  the  reserve  and  therefore  must  suspend 
operations.  By  nature  poor  in  resources,  Ger- 
many has  undertaken,  by  checking  the  influx  of 
the  world's  wealth,  to  provide  for  its  vast  ex- 
penditures and  thus  put  off  the  day  of  exhaus- 
tion. It  is  attempting  to  become  rich  by  shut- 
ting its  doors  to  the  offered  abundance  of  other 
nations. 

Considering  the  motives  which  move  men  to 
wealth-production,  it  is  a  self-evident  proposi- 
tion that  if  men  are  left  free  to  act,  they  will  put 


17 


forth  their  productive  forced  in  the  direction  of 
thei'-  greatest  productive  ability;  and  no  central 
power,  however  f ar-seeing  in  its  paternal  super- 
vision, can  determine  this  direction  in  the  mil- 
lions of  individual  cases  as  well  as  the  individuals 
them. selves.  It  follows,  therefore,  that  where 
the  individual  members  of  a  nation  are  left  free 
in  their  industrial  and  commercial  activity, 
there  will  be  the  maximum  of  wealth-produc- 
tion for  the  nation  as  a  whole.  But  the  German 
government  has  seen  fit  to  tnrust  its  interfering 
hand  not  only  into  that  which  the  English  peo- 
ple are  disposed  to  regard  as  the  peculiar  realm  of 
personal  liberty,  but  also  into  the  affairs  of  in- 
dustry and  trade.  By  its  restrictions  and  im- 
positions, it  has  lifted  certain  departments  into 
unnatural  prominence,  and  crowded  others  into 
enforced  insignificance.  This  policy  has  had  a 
threefold  result.  In  the  first  place,  it  has 
brought  to  the  government  an  increased  rev- 
enue, which  has  enabled  it  not  only  to  meet  its 
current  expenses,  but  also  to  build  numerous 
imposing  structures,  either  for  use  in  practical 
affairs  or  for  commemorating  the  heroic  achieve- 
ments of  the  army.  This  architectural  display, 
supported  by  the  revenues  of  the  government, 
has  betrayed  superficial  observers  into  the  con- 


18 


vie! ion  that  the  nation  itself  is  growing'  rich.  In 
the  second  place,  this  policy  of  industrial  and 
commercial  restriction  has  had  the  effect  of 
bringing  about  a  more  unequal  distribution  of 
wealth,  giving  to  certain  manufacturers  in- 
creased gains,  without  at  the  same  time  adding 
materially  to  the  aggregate  gains  of  the  nation, 
or  increasing  proportionately  the  rewards  of  la- 
bor. The  wealth  that  has  been  added  to  the 
manufacturer's  store  has  been  taken  from  the 
store  of  the  consumer,  for  while  prices  have  ad- 
vanced, wages  have  remained  comparatively 
stationary.  Thus,  in  the  third  place,  this  policy 
has  contributed  to  the  difficulties  which  the  bulk 
of  the  population  experience  in  maintaining  a 
decent  existence.  Prices  have  been  raised  by  ex- 
cluding other  nations  from  free  competition  in 
the  markets,  but  the  incomes  of  the  masses  have 
not  risen  in  a  corresponding  degree,  if  they  have 
risen  at  all.  In  fact  Prussian  statistics  seem  to 
indicate  that  the  class  whose  incomes  are  less 
than  one  hundred  and  twenty-five  dollars  a  year, 
has  increased  much  faster  than  other  classes. 
In  1882,  this  class  constituted  more  than  one 
quarter  of  the  Prussian  population,  and  in  the 
preceding  five  years  it  had  increased  by  a  mil- 
lion and  a  half.  "The  statistics  of  the  other  Ger- 


19 


man  States,"  writes  Geffcken  in  1884,  "show  a  si  m- 
il.tr  result;  the  poor-rates  have  increased  every- 
where in  an  alarming  proportion,  and  the  num- 
ber of  vagrants  and  tramps  have  become  a  gen- 
eral  plague.  Our  industrial  production  suffers 
from  chronic  plethora,  its  net  produce  does  not 
correspond  to  its  immense  expansion,  still  less  is  a 
real  amelioration  of  the  situation  of  the  working 
classes  to  be  decerned.  The  supply  of  labor  gen- 
erally exceeds  the  demands;  consequently  wages 
do  not  rise,  and  the  lower  strata  of  the  popula- 
tion can  absorb  comparatively  little  of  the  mass 
of  products  which  are  daily  thrown  upon  the 
market,  because  the  scantiness  of  their  earnings 
does  not  allow  them  to  satisfy  correspondingly 
their  wants.  But  in  the  higher  classes  also  all 
the  callings  are  overcrowded;  the  increase  of 
academical  students  has  been  abnormal  and  far 
exceeding  the  demand,  and  a  considerable  part 
of  this  surplus  of  trained  forces,  finding  no  em- 
ployment, perishes  or  launches  into  adventures. 
In  short,  everywhere  we  find  an  enhanced  strug- 
gle for  existence,  which  engenders  dissatisfac- 
tion and  hopelessness,  and  furnishes  social  de- 
mocracy with  fresh  recruits." 

The  influence  of  the  German  government,  with 
reference  to  this  last  suggestion  by  Dr.  Geffcken, 


20 

merits  thoughtful  consideration;  I  mean  the  ii> 
fluence  of  the  imperial  policy  on  the  socialistic 
agitation  of  the  present.  Reduced  to  its  lowest 
terms,  the  doctrine  of  modern  Socialism  is  an 
affirmation  on  the  much-debated  question  as  to 
t lie  proper  sphere  of  governmental  action.  "It 
is  not  only  a  theory  of  the  state's  action,  but  a 
theory  of  the  state's  action  founded  on  a  theory 
of  the  laborer's  right."  It  is  the  extreme  oppo- 
site to  that  theory  which  maintains  the  "abso- 
lute abstention  on  the  part  of  the  state  in  all  that 
concerns  material  well-being."  Such  a  theory  of 
state  action  as  that  embodied  in  Socialism  is  not 
hi  keeping  with  the  democratic  spirit;  it  is  rather 
to  be  considered  as  a  logical  outgrowth  of  a  mon- 
archy which  extends  its  paternal  protection  and 
control  over  many  details  which  in  a  republic  are 
left  to  the  discreet  management  of  individuals. 
It  is  natural,  therefore,  to  expect  the  development 
of  the  socialistic  doctrine  in  Germany,  where 
power  is  exercised  under  a  liberal  conception  of 
the  sphere  of  state  authority,  rather  than  in  a 
republic  where  the  people  are  jealous  of  state 
power,  even  when  it  is  delegated  by  themselves. 
The  practice  of  the  German  government,  in  en- 
tering extensively  into  the  affairs  of  business, 
has  tended  to  deepen  the  conviction  that  it  might, 


21 

with  advantage  to  the  laborers,  go  to  still  greater 
lengths  in  tl]e  ownership  of  the  agents  of  pro- 
duction. In  maintaining  the  army,  moreover, 
conditions  are  established  favorable  to  the  in- 
crease of  Socialism.  Large  numbers  of  men  aiv 
called  from  those  occupations  in  which  they 
must  rely  on  their  individual  efforts  for  support, 
to  spend  a  series  of  years  under  conditions  where 
the  burden  of  support  is  shifted  to  the  govern- 
ment. Going  back  from  the  army  to  a  society 
in  which  the  struggle  for  life  is  severe,  they 
carry  with  them  the  knowledge  of  what  the  state 
may  do  to  relieve  them  of  the  labor  and  anxieties 
of  this  struggle.  Having  seen  that  the  state  can 
successfully  manage  great  productive  enter- 
prises, and  also  that  it  may  support  under  its 
immediate  charge  large  bodies  of  its  citizens, 
they  are,  at  this  stage,  ripe  for  the  reception  of 
the  socialistic  gospel.  The  very  process,  through 
which  a  large  number  of  minds  have  been  fitted 
to  receive  a  new  social  dispensation,  has  also  pre- 
pared some  of  the  bolder  spirits  to  become  heralds 
of  the  glad  tidings.  From  these  and  other  con- 
siderations more  or  less  dependent  on  the  action 
and  organization  of  the  society,  we  are  able  to 
see  how  the  German  nation  has  become  the 
mother  of  the  present  discontent,  and  the  Em- 


22 


pire  the  breeding  place  of  agitators  whose  fanati- 
cism is  only  equalled  by  their  social  short-sight- 
edness. They  become  a  menace  to  social  order, 
not  because  their  views  prove  false  the  accepted 
basis  of  society,  but  because  they  appeal  to  those 
elements  of  the  community  whose  actions  are 
not  a  matter  of  reason  but  of  sympathy.  They 
are  the  product  of  a  rigid  and  repressive  admin- 
istration, yet  the  end  of  their  agitation  is  a  sys- 
tem which,  to  be  successful,  must  be  a  thous.md 
times  more  rigid  and  far-reaching  in  its  tyranny 
than  any  government  which  they  oppose.  Their 
opposition  is  thorough,  but  not  necessarily  en- 
lightened or  consistent.  In  their  missionary 
tours,  they  do  not  stop  to  understand  either  the 
faults  or  the  excellences  of  different  govern- 
ments, but  are  ready,  without  examining  them, 
to  lay  destructive  hands  on  all. 

When  republican  doctrines  were  being  car- 
ried out  in  France,  in  1789,  the  adherents  of 
monarchy  in  Europe  thought  themselves  justi- 
fied in  combining  to  prevent  their  spread  to 
other  countries.  Had  the  efforts  of  the  several 
monarchical  states  been  confined  to  upholding 
their  own  institutions  against  the  assaults  of  im- 
migrants from  republican  France,  just  men 
everywhere  would  have  been  in  sympathy  with 


28 


their  undertaking.  But  in  attempting  to  crush 
republicanism  in  France,  they  went  beyond  their 
proper  sphere.  The  citizens  of  the  republic  of 
the  United  States  have  no  desire  to  seek  to 
modify  the  social  and  political  institutions  of  the 
German  Empire,  or  to  interfere  with  their  pro- 
duction of  socialists  or  anarchists;  they  desire 
only  that  the  foul  brood  may  be  retained  and  fed 
in  the  original  nest.  While  the  repressive  and 
protective  governmental  policy  of  Germany, 
which  limits  in  a  large  measure  the  personal 
independence  of  the  subject,  is  the  fundamental 
cause  of  this  social  revolt,  it  has  a  secondary 
cause  in  the  hard  economic  conditions  to  which 
the  masses  are  doomed.  Yet  these  hard  econ- 
omic.oonditions  &re  the  very  foundation  of  ex- 
cellence in  certain  departments.  In  the  United 
States  it  is  difficult  to  persuade  men  of  high 
attainments  to  devote  their  lives  to  primary 
teaching  for  the  low  sulary  at  which  women,  not 
of  high  attainments,  may  be  induced  to  undertake 
the  work.  The  opportunities  for  individual  en- 
terprise, with  sure  and  abundant  material  re- 
ward, call  men  to  other  pursuits.  But  in  Ger- 
many men  of  high  attainments  are  willing  for 
an  assured  pittance  to  devrote  their  lives  to  in- 
struction in  the  lower  schools,  recognizing  the 


fact  that  if  they  abandon  their  positions  they  will 
be  thrown  into  a  severe  struggle  for-  existence 
without  certainty  of  satisfactory  reward.  Thus 
the  poverty  of  German  resources  keeps  men  in 
these  lower  but  vastly  important  positions.  Tiie 
superiority  of  German  schools,  therefore,  over 
those  of  the  United  States,  is  in  large  part  due  to 
the  inferiority  of  Germany's  opportunities  for  ad- 
vancing material  well-being.  It  is  not  because 
the  German  loves  money  less  than  the  Ameri- 
can, but  simply  because  his  opportunities  for 
getting  it  are  worse. 

Thus  far  I  have  spoken  only  of  the  internal 
forces  and  tendencies  of  the  Empire.  What  the 
operation  of  these  forces  will  be  in  the  future 
will  depend  somewhat  upon  the  position  which 
the  Empire  maintains  in  the  group  of  Western 
nations.  The  external  relations  of  the  Germans 
hive  been  vague  and  indefinite  because  the  peo- 
ple have  lacked  national  unity.  We  are  able  to 
p  >int  out,  however,  in  the  course  of  German 
history  various  periods  when  the  foreign  rela- 
tions of  the  nation  have  been  of  marked  influence 
in  determining  its  internal  development.  In 
the  first  stages  of  German  imperialism,  the  con- 
nection between  Germany  and  Italy  was  most 
important.  It  was  the  connection  of  a  nation 


25 

having  traditions  of  cultivation,  with  a  nation 
whose  traditions  smacked  of  the  forests  and  bar- 
barism. The 'German  soldiers  followed  the  Em- 
perors over  the  Alps,  and  many  never  returned, 
but  there  came  back  from  Italy  germs  of  a  higher 
culture.  Still  the  men  who  had  acquired  in  Italy 
somewhat  of  cultivation,  and  tasted  the  refine- 
ments of  an  old  civilization,  remained  always 
under  the  fatal  attraction  which  allured  them  to 
the  shores  of  the  Mediterranean.  When  the 
bond  was  severed  which  had  bound  Germany 
arid  Italy  into  one  great  Empire,  the  several 
states  of  Germany  were  pretending  to  independ- 
ence, and  the  relations  between  them  were  as- 
suming the  form  of  international  relations. 
When  the  people  were  finally  divided  by  their 
ecclesiastical  quarrels,  the  way  was  prepared  for 
a  great  national  humiliation.  The  utter  mate- 
rial desolation  which  appeared  in  the  track  of 
the  Thirty-Years'  War  was  Hot  a  greater  nation- 
al calamity  than  that  loss  of  independence  which 
is  manifest  when  we  behold  the  Protestant  states 
knocking  at  the  doors  of  foreign  princes,  and 
asking  for  aid  and  protection,  and  the  emperor 
submitting  to  conditions  which  practically  de- 
prived him  of  the  imperial  dignity,  in  order  to 
wee u re  th3  services  of  such  an  adventurer  as 


26 

Wallenstein.  But  even  a  greater  depth  was 
reached  in  the  eighteenth  century,  when  every 
petty  prince  of  Germany  constructed  the  cere- 
mony of  his  court  and  the  administration  of  his 
principality  after  the  model  of  the  court  and 
administration  of  Louis  XIV.  French  influence 
was  so  thoroughly  dominant  that  it  paralyzed 
all  manifestations  of  the  German  spirit,  and  ren- 
dered futile  all  attempts  to  further  the  national 
development.  Even  so  conspicious  a  leader  of 
the  Germans  as  Frederick  the  Great  exerted 
whatever  influence  he  possessed  in  favor  of  ex- 
tending in  Germany  the  culture  of  France. 

The  complete  national  demoralization  of  Ger- 
many at  the  close  of  the  last  century,  the  loss  of 
national  conciousness,  and  the  almost  entire  ab- 
sence of  lofty  patriotism,  made  it  compirativsly 
easy  for  the  conquered  German  States  to  submit 
to  the  conditions  of  the  Napoleonic  rule.  With 
sonu  other  nations  this  would  have  meant  a  far 
greater  sacrifice.  Had  the  English,  for  example, 
heen  obliged  to  submit  to  similar  conditions,  it 
would  have  cost  them  the  painful  renunciation 
of  that  \vhich  had  grown  to  be  a  vital  part  of 
their  moral  being.  But  the  moral  being  of  the 
German  at  that  time  was  incomplete;  it  lacked 
the  essential  elem9iit  of  love  of  country.  It  was 


27 


only  when  the  patriotic'  trumpet  blasts  of  Kor- 
ner  and  of  Arndt  .swept  over  the  land,  and 
roused  a  responsive  echo  in  the  hearts  of  the 
people,  that  the  lacking*  element  was  supplied. 
The  history  of  Germany's  relation  to  foreign 
powers  previous  to  this  time  is  an  unenviable 
record.  But  at  this  point  begins  a  period  of 
great  national  achievements  in  foreign  affairs, 
through  the  important  crises  of  which  the  na- 
tion has  been  carried  by  the  well-directed  force 
of  patriotic  enthusiasm.  While  the  struggle 
was  for  independence,  as  in  1813,  or  for  bringing 
about  a  more  perfect  national  union,  as  in  1866 
and  in  1870,  it  was  comparatively  easy  to  keep 
alive  the  patriotic  fire;  and  in  so  far  as  the  reign 
of  William  has  created  a  tradition  of  heroic 
achievements  in  which  the  members  of  all  states 
are  proud  to  claim  participation,  there  has  been 
added  a  stimulus  to  the  maintenance  of  the 
newly  awakened  consciousness.  But  the  press* 
ure  of  poverty,  which  is  being  felt  by  a  larger 
and  larger  part  of  the  population,  tends  in  time 
of  peace  to  crush  out  patriotic  sentiment  and 
breed  discontent.  Yet  no  way  appears  open  to 
the  Empire  for  an  offensive  war  of  conquest 
through  which  to  quiet  discontent  and  arouse 
once  more  popular  enthusiasm;  and  the  defen- 


28 

sive  war  which  must  be  undertaken  against 
Russia  sooner  or  later  cannot  be  said  to  offer  a 
flattering  prospect  either  to  the  government  or 
to  the  people.  Although,  therefore,  the  Ger- 
mans have  known  how  to  make  use  of  external 
pressure  from  various  sides  to  weld  the  bonds  of 
national  union,  and  to  create  a  powerful  senti- 
ment in  favor  of  the  Empire,  the  way  does  not 
appear  open  to  an  equ  illy  advantageous  usa  of 
those  relations  in  the  future.  There  seems  to  be 
no  scope  for  the  future  activity  of  the  Empire 
in  international  affairs  but  to  stand  in  a  position 
of  resistance.  It  has  extended  its  territory  to  a 
point  which  reason  and  the  traditions  of  the  na- 
tion suggest  as  a  proper  limit.  It  has  closed  a 
successful  movement  towards  union  with  a  ser- 
ies of  brilliant  victories,  and  it  may  now  abstain 
from  pursuing  an  aggressive  p;>!L*y  with  entire 
self-respect;  in  fact,  there  is  no  direction  in 
which  such  a  policy  can  be  pursued  with  advan- 
tage and  a  show  of  justice.  But  with  the  na- 
tions which  stand  as  rivals  of  the  Empire,  France 
and  Russia,  the  case  is  quite  different.  They 
are  predetermined  to  aggression:  France,  by  rea- 
son of  her  wounded  pride,  her  great  losses  of 
territory  and  wealth  and  her  desire  to  regain  the 
position  so  long  held  as  the  leader  of  European 


29 

civilization;  Russia,  through  the  force  of  a  tenden- 
cy as  old  as  the  monarchy,  and  which  for  a  thou- 
sand years  has  been  making  itself  manifest  in 
pushing  out  the  borders  of  the  Empire  in  all  di- 
rections. Between  these  two  powers,  the  Ger- 
man Empire,  in  the  immediate  future,  Lsdoomi  J 
to  the  ungrateful  task  of  m.iiat  lining  a  powerful 
army  of  defense.  In  the  case  of  a  nation  like 
France,  whose  parts  have  had  no  independent 
existence  for  centuries,  external  pressure  tends 
to  unite  all  parties  and  factions  in  the  vigorous 
pursuit  of  a  common  end,  in  other  words,  to 
bring  about  a  more  complete  national  consolida- 
tion. But  in  the  case  of  Germany,  where  the 
several  States  retain  a  happy  memory  of  inde- 
pendence, external  pressure  will  not  necessarily 
bring  about  a  more  complete  union  and  consoli- 
dation. If  it  is  strong  enough  to  threaten  to 
overwhelm  the  Empire,  it  will  the  rather  have 
a  tendency  to  loosen  the  bonds  of  union  between 
the  States  and  lead  them  to  seek  safety  in  for- 
eign alliances,  thereby  destroying  the  integrity 
of  the  imperial  state.  Thereforp,  although  the 
constitution  has  provided  the  strongest  political 
barrier  possible  against  the  disintegration  of  the 
Empire,  such  di  integration  may  become  one  of 
the  unavoidable  consequences  of  an  aggressive 


30 

policy  on  the  part  of  Prance  or  Russia.  That 
such  is  to  be  the  policy  of  these  two  nations  does 
not  admit  of  doubt.  France  which  all  the  world 
is  disposed  to  leave  in  peace  within  her  borders, 
does  not  wish  peace.  Her  annual  army  expenses 
are  now  even  more  than  those  of  the  German 
Empire;  and  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the 
French  nation  is  building1  up  a  great  military  es^ 
tabiishment  simply  that  it  may  later  go  to  pieces 
through  idleness  and  corruption.  By  this  vast 
expenditure,  France  is  preparing  1113  ins  which, 
in  the  impending  European  war,  may  enable 
her  to  have  revenge  on  her  ancient  enemy  and 
set  up  once  more  her  former  prestige. 

The  initiative,  however,  in  Germany's  embar- 
rassments from  without  is  not  likely  to  be  taken 
by  France,  but  by  Russia.  Two  hundred  an i  fifty 
years  ago  the  western  limit  of  this  colossal 
empire  was  a  line  running  through  a  point  east 
of  the  site  of  St.  Petersburg.  The  political 
center  of  the  Czar's  dominions  has  thus  been 
transferred  to  a  region  which  in  the  seventeenth 
century  was  a  part  of  the  Swedish  territory. 
In  this  gradual  and  apparently  irresistible  move- 
ment westward,  many  states  and  provinces  have 
been  absorbed,  till  at  last  a  halt  has  been  made 
on  the  borders  of  the  German  Empire.  Whether* 


t\\ls  halt  will  be  permanent  or  merely  temporary 
will  depend  upon  the  ability  of  Germany  to  cet 
up  a  wall  of  defense  firm  enough  to  resist  the 
glacier-like  movement  of  the  Russian  power. 
For  an  indisputable  solution  of  this  doubt  history 
affords  only  one  method,  that  of  actual  conflict; 
and  in  the  conflict,  or  series  of  conflicts,  which 
is  to'  determine  the  relative  position  of  two 
nations,  the  ultimate  supremacy  will  incline  to 
that  nation  which  has  the  more  abundant 
resources,  either  realized  or  undeveloped,  of 
men  and  wealth.  In  this  respect  Russia  and  the 
United  States  are  the  two  leading  nations  of 
the  world.  They  are  nations  not  yet  in  the 
prime  of  life,  whose  period  of  maximum  wealth 
and  po"wer  relatively  to  other  nations  is  in  the 
future;  while  some  of  the  other  Western  states, 
as  Spain  and,  perhaps,  England,  have  passed 
their  prime,  and  in  the  future  of  civilization 
will  grow  relatively  less.  Russia,  therefore, 
appears  to  be  destined  to  fill  a  larger  place  than 
hitherto  in  the  community  of  nations,  and  it  is 
not  improbable  that  earlier  or  later  some  of  its 
territorial  expansion  will  be  gained  at  the  ex- 
pense of  the  German  Empire.  But  for  a  deter- 
mination of  the  extent  to  which  the  Napoleonic 
prophecy  will  be  fulfilled  we  look  to  the  future. 


14  DAY  USE 

\  RETURN  TO  DESK  FROM  WHICH  BORROWED 

LOAN  DEPT. 

This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 
Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


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